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Abstract 
This paper argues that although the crisis may have emerged in the financial sector, its 
roots are much deeper and lie in a structural change in income distribution that has been 
going on for the past three decades. The widespread increase of inequality depressed 
aggregate demand and prompted monetary policy to react by maintaining a low level of 
interest rate which itself allowed private debt to increase beyond sustainable levels. On the 
other hand the search for high-return investment by those who benefited from the increase 
in inequalities led to the emergence of bubbles. Net wealth became overvalued, and high 
asset prices gave the false impression that high levels of debt were sustainable. The crisis 
revealed itself when the bubbles exploded, and net wealth returned to normal level. We 
further argue that how the trend of increasing inequality interacted differently with policies 
and institutions, to yield radically different outcomes in the US and in the large European 
Union countries before the onset of the crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
The financial crisis, triggered by a modest number of defaults on subprime mortgages, has 
evolved into a systemic crisis because of the chain of financial innovations prompted by lax 
monetary policy and loose regulatory framework, which multiplied the effects of the initial 
shock. Contagion to the real economy mainly happened through tightening credit constraints 
for households and firms. In an attempt to recover more reasonable ratios, banks either 
hoarded liquidity or lent at high rates. On the other hand, firms tended to use their own cash 
flow to restore more prudential ratios of debt to capital, thus postponing investment. 
Households suffered from a negative wealth effect, which led to a sharp reduction in private 
consumption. Furthermore, the contraction in asset values triggered a race to deleveraging and 
to the accumulation of safe assets by financial institutions, firms and households alike. The 
most obvious effect of this flight to safety has been a severe tightening of credit conditions, 
which constituted the main channel for the transmission of the crisis to the real sector. The 
result was a generalized decrease in aggregate demand. 
Thus, the combination of a negative wealth effect and of increasingly tight credit constraints 
has caused the private expenditure drop and the aggregate demand deficiency that required 
massive intervention from fiscal authorities to sustain economic activity. 
The world as it is, at least the industrialized world, is still, three years after the beginning of 
the crisis, in a situation of aggregate demand deficiency.  
Nevertheless, the deep roots of the current situation do not lie only in the financial meltdown, 
or in the debt deflation.  These are only the events that triggered the crisis.  
The problem we are facing is more general, and before analyzing what measures will lift us 
out of the current situation, we have to ask how we arrived at this point. Some are arguing that 
the lax monetary policy preceding the crisis together with the deregulation of financial 
markets is the main suspect. And there are little doubts that these causes have played a role. 
But something else is needed to explain why the expansion of the financial sector was so out 
of touch with that of the rest of the economy. And why for example in the US the financial 
sector represented about 40% of the total profit of the economy.  
This chapter will argue that another structural cause of the crisis is an increase in inequalities 
which depressed aggregate demand and prompted monetary policy to react by maintaining a 
low level of interest rate which itself allowed private debt to increase beyond sustainable 
levels. On the other hand the search for high-return investment by those who benefited from 
the increase in inequalities led to the emergence of bubbles. Net wealth became overvalued, 
and high asset prices gave the false impression that high levels of debt were sustainable. The 
crisis revealed itself when the bubbles exploded, and net wealth returned to normal level. So 
although the crisis may have emerged in the financial sector, its roots are much deeper and lie 
in a structural change in income distribution that had been going on for the past three decades 
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Section 2 describes the trend toward increasing inequality in most developed and emerging 
countries. We will then argue, in section 3 that this has caused a chronic deficiency in 
aggregate demand. Section 4 analyses how this trend interacted differently with policies and 
institutions, to yield two radically different outcomes in the US and in the large European 
Union countries before the onset of the crisis. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. The Trend towards Increasing Inequality 
 
The increased income inequality during at least the past two decades, in most advanced and 
emerging economies has been widely documented (see IMF, (2007), OECD, (2008) and 
Krueger et al., (2010) among the most recent works). In most advanced countries the average 
wage stagnated, while inequalities surged in favour of the upper quintile of the distribution. 
The literature also documents that consumption inequality did not increase as much as income 
inequality. 
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Figure 1 Average yearly growth of income minus growth of average wage. Mid-1980s to mid-2000s. 
Source:OECD, (2008). Calculations of the authors 
 
Figure 1, taken from data of OECD, (2008), shows the difference between the average growth 
of real income for each quintile (or group of quintiles) and the growth of average income, 
over the two decades mid-1980s to mid-2000s. The figure clearly depicts redistribution from 
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the four bottom quintiles to the fifth, which is the only one that shows an increase over the 
period above average real income. While we only took the most representative countries, the 
OECD study shows this trend to be common to most countries in the group. 
Over the twenty years we observe only one exception, France, where growth for the lower 
quintile was larger than for the average wage. Nevertheless, even for France this trend was 
reversed in the last decade. 
Figure 2 shows the changes in the Gini coefficient from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s. This 
coefficient is subject to a number of criticisms, and it hides wide variations in income 
inequality among the different quintiles; thus, absolute values of the coefficient should be 
regarded with cautiousness. Nevertheless, the trend depicted by the figure is unequivocal, and 
it points to an important increase of inequality for most countries. 
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Figure 2 Change in Gini coefficient from mid-1980s to mid-2000s, together with values of the mid-2000s 
Source OECDStat. * denotes mid 1970s as starting point 
 
The phenomenon of redistribution is even more marked than these figures shows. Dew-
Becker and Gordon, (2005) speak of “superstar economy”, showing that in fact, those 
benefiting more from the redistribution are those at the very top of the income distribution 
(top 1%). 
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The Role of Policy in the Trend of Income Distribution 
Going over the causes of the widespread increase of income inequality would go beyond the 
scopes of this essay. The usual suspects are globalization and “the great doubling”, to use the 
expression of Richard Freeman, non neutral technical progress, and the star system – the 
winner takes it all story. Nevertheless, as we are concerned with the role of economic policy, 
one factor, surely linked with globalization and the universal search for competitiveness, is 
worth mentioning. Since the early 1980s, the progressivity of tax systems and the tax burden 
on businesses has substantially decreased. 
Table 1 reports central government marginal tax rates of a few European countries, together 
with the number of tax brackets. This measure is only partial, as the overall degree of 
progressivity also depends on the structure of the tax base, on thresholds, exemptions, and so 
on); one can nevertheless easily see that in most countries there was a sharp decrease in both 
the marginal rate and the number of brackets, the symptom of decreased progressivity of the 
tax system.  
 
Table 1. Number of tax brackets and marginal income tax rates* 
   1981 1991 2001 2008 
Number of Brackets 23 7 7 5 
Belgium 
Maximum Rate 72% 55% 55% 50% 
Number of Brackets 12 12 6 4 
France 
Maximum Rate 60% 56.80% 52.75% 40% 
Number of Brackets 2 2 2 2 
Germany 
Maximum Rate 56% 53% 48.50% 45% 
Number of Brackets 32 7 5 5 
Italy 
Maximum Rate 72% 50% 45% 43% 
Number of Brackets 30 16 6 4 
Spain 
Maximum Rate 65.1%56% 39.6% 27.1%
Number of Brackets 5 3 2 2 
Ireland 
Maximum Rate 60% 52% 42% 41% 
Number of Brackets 6 2 3 2 
UK 
Maximum Rate 60% 40% 40% 40% 
Number of Brackets 16 2 5 5 
US 
Maximum Rate 70% 31% 39.10% 35% 
* Central government rates 
Source: OECD Tax Database (www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase). Calculations of the authors. 
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Table 2 displays corporate tax rates in EU-15 countries, where in most cases, corporate tax 
rates have decreased since 1990 or 2000. The common wisdom maintains that this significant 
and widespread reduction enhances incentives to investment and hence increases 
employment. Nevertheless, they also induce a shift of the burden of taxation from capital 
income to wage, the former accruing in a larger proportion to the richest layers of the 
population. 
The shift of taxation from upper to lower incomes fits within a general trend towards the 
reduction of the collective insurance role of the government (for a detailed discussion, see 
Creel and Saraceno, (2009)) that was partly based on an important redistributive role of the 
tax and benefits system. This contributed, along with many other factors (globalization and 
competition from low-wage countries, skill-biased technological progress, etc) to the 
substantial increase of income inequality of the past three decades. 
 
Table 2. Main corporate tax rate, in percentage points 
 1990 2000 2005 2009  1990 2000 2005 2009
Austria 30  25 20 Ireland 43 10*** 24 12.5 12.5 
Belgium 43 40.2 35.5 35.5 Italy 36 37 33 27.5 
Denmark 50  28 25 Luxembourg 34 37.5 30.4 21.8 
Finland 33 29 26 26 Netherlands 35  31.5 25.5 
France 42 * 37 ** 37.8 34.9 34.4 Portugal 34  27.5 25 
Germany 36 * 50 ** 52 39.3 15.8 Spain 35 35 35 30 
Greece 46 40***  32 25 Sweden 52  28 26.3 
UK 35 30 30 28      
Sources: European Tax Handbook 2005 and 2009. 
* Distributed profit ** Retained profit *** Industry 
 
The combined result of these changes has been a generalized decrease of the wage share, 
which is common to most OECD countries (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3 Labour Income Shares 
Source: OECD 
 
3. The Macroeconomic effects of Increased Inequality 
 
From a macroeconomic point of view, the increase in inequality triggers redistribution from 
households with high propensity to consume to households with a lower propensity to 
consume and/or from households credit constrained to households without such a constraint. 
The reasons for this difference in the propensities may be traced back to the work of Kalecki 
and Kaldor on income distribution (Kalecki, (1942); Kaldor, (1955)), and it may be related to 
a minimum consumption (subsistence) level, to liquidity or credit constraints, or to satiation 
phenomena. 
If propensities to consume differ, then the overall propensity to consume is affected by 
income distribution, and an increase in inequality causes it to decrease. The reduction of 
consumption demand, then, puts downward pressure on aggregate demand and on income 
(unless some compensation comes from other items, like government spending or external 
demand). 
On a global level, then, the increase of inequality has generated a chronic deficiency of 
aggregate demand, and a tendency of growth to stagnate. Yet, the growth performances in the 
past two decades diverged. The next section will look into the causes of this divergence. 
7 
4. Inequality and Macroeconomic Performance in the United 
States and in Europe  
The United States and the European Union are economies with many similarities in what 
concerns the level of development, technological development and the like. Furthermore, as 
we saw in section 1, they experienced the same trend of increasing income inequality.        
Even for what concerns market flexibility, in particular for what concerns labor markets, most 
European countries significantly increased it, so that the differences in market flexibility with 
the US are not as large as they used to be in the early 1980s. As an example, table 3 shows 
that except in a few countries (France, Ireland and the UK, even if the latest two experienced 
reductions in the replacement rates and benefit duration), the employment protection 
legislation (EPL) index1 has been reduced since the mid-1980s and, quite often, sharply so 
like in Belgium, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Flexibility, in other words does 
not seem anymore a major difference factor between continental Europe and the United 
States2
 
Table 3 EPL index*. Selected years    
 1985 1995  2008  1985 1995 2008
Austria 2.21 2.21  1.93 Italy 3.57 3.57 1.89 
Belgium 3.15 3.15  2.18 Netherlands 2.73 2.73 1.95 
Denmark 2.4 1.5  1.5 Portugal 4.19 3.85 3.15 
Finland 2.33 2.16  1.96 Spain 3.82 3.01 2.98 
France 2.79 2.98  3.05 Sweden 3.49 2.47 1.87 
Germany 3.17 3.09  2.12 UK 0.6 0.6 0.75 
Greece 3.56 3.5  2.73 US 0.21 0.21 0.21 
Ireland 0.93 0.93  1.11     
Source: OECD, (2004). *Version 1 (unweighted) 
Data for 2005 and 2008 from OECD STATS    
 
                                                 
 
1 The EPL, introduced by Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud, (2000), is extensively discussed in OECD, (2004). It 
is built by aggregation of 18 indexes from three main areas: Employment protection of regular workers against 
individual dismissal; specific requirements for collective dismissals; and regulation of temporary forms of 
employment.  As all aggregative indexes, it is not exempt from criticisms (see e.g.Bertola, Boeri and Cazes, 
(2000); Fitoussi, (2003)). Nevertheless, it is a useful representation of the trends in employment protection over 
time. 
2 This explains, probably, why the evidence on the effects of market flexibility on growth and unemployment are 
empirically so difficult to disentangle (see Fitoussi et al., (2000)). 
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Nevertheless, the growth performance of the US and of European countries (especially 
continental Europe) has been diverging since the early 1980s. The US grew at more than 
satisfying rates, around or above their potential, while most European countries struggled, 
with soft growth and stagnating employment (Figure 4). 
So the question arises of why a common phenomenon (the trend of increasing inequality), 
which we argue should be significantly affecting macroeconomic performance, does not yield 
uniform growth rates in all countries. 
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Figure 4 Average Growth Rates per Decade 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook – Datastream 
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Figure 5 – Household Short and Long Term Outstanding Loans as a Ratio to GDP - 2007 
 
Shocks plus Institutions Once More 
We maintain that the answer to the apparent contradiction between a common trend of 
increasing inequality and differing macroeconomic performances can be found in the 
interaction of the chronic aggregate demand deficiency, common to all the countries, with the 
institutional differences, and the policy responses, that were instead extremely different. In 
the US, and in some European countries (UK, Spain), the reduction of income has been 
compensated by increasing private indebtedness, made easier by an increasingly deregulated 
financial system3.Figure 5 and Figure 6 show short and long term loans as a ratio of GDP 
between 1995 and 2007 (2008 was dropped because the crisis had already hit the economy). 
The figures show that both in terms of levels and in growth rates, short term debt (mostly 
consumption credit) has been substantially larger in the US and in the UK than in continental 
Europe. In these countries as a consequence, the level of consumption remained high, but 
financed out of debt rather than out of income (see Cynamon and Fazzari, (2008)). In 
continental Europe, more restrictive rules for financial markets made credit more costly and 
difficult to obtain, prevented a similar expansion of debt. Spain is an intermediate case, in the 
                                                 
 
3 The increasing levels of debt were also fueled by a diffuse feeling of “end of history”, such that thanks to 
skillful monetary policies and to financial development, cycles would belong to the past, and asset prices could 
keep increasing forever. 
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sense that it experienced a significant increase of both short and long (mortgages) debt. The 
level of the former, nevertheless, remained extremely low, and in fact, the Spanish 
exceptional growth of the early years 2000 has been largely determined by the boom of the 
housing sector. 
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Figure 6  - Change in the outstanding Household Loan to GDP Ratio  (1995-2007) 
 
The countries where short term (consumption) loans increased more are the ones in which 
growth over the period 1995-2007 was more robust (see Figure 7 ). This points to a growth 
rate driven by domestic consumption. 
The picture is somewhat confirmed by Figure 8 As can be seen, the share of consumption 
remained constant in France and Italy it actually decreased in Germany, while it increased in 
Spain, the US and the UK  
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Figure 7 - Cumulate change in household short term loans (x-axis) vs change in real GDP (y-axis), 1995-
2007. The trend line is also shown 
Source: OECD. Authors’ calculations 
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Figure 8 - Consumption Shares 
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Germany is particularly interesting in this respect, because it shifted towards an export-led 
model of growth. Table 4 shows that while all the domestic component of demand decreased 
in size between 1991 and 2007, the current account increased considerably to more than 7% 
of GDP. 
 
Table 4: Germany, National Accounts as shares of GDP 
  Consumption Investment 
Government 
Spending 
Current 
Account 
1991 59% 21.8% 19.1% 0.1% 
2007 54.6% 20% 18% 7.4% 
Source: OECD 
 
The German strategy is puzzling for a number of reasons. The first is that Germany is by far 
the biggest European country and one would have expected that this fact should have pushed 
it to rely more on internal demand. The second is as the growth figures of Figure 4 show, the 
strategy was not very successful. But maybe the enigma can be resolved if we take into 
account both the ageing of its population and German unification or more precisely the way 
the unification was handled (Fitoussi et al., (1993)). 
 
Macroeconomic Policies and Aggregate Demand 
Macroeconomic policies contributed to the diverging performances. US fiscal and monetary 
policies were more reactive to shocks (even during the current crisis). We have discussed 
elsewhere (Fitoussi and Saraceno, (2004, (2008; 2010)) how the set of institutions for the 
economic governance of Europe is consistent with the doctrine that dominated in the 1990s, 
that pledged for a rule-based system aimed at preventing discretionary interventions and at 
pursuing nominal stability, because the growth objective would be attained through structural 
reforms alone. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the strict inflation targeting 
contained in the statute of the European Central Bank (ECB) did in fact succeed in attaining 
nominal stability and convergence (Fitoussi and Laurent, (2009)). But, not surprisingly, this 
came at the price of two decades of soft growth (Fitoussi, (1996; 2001)). Moreover the 
emphasis on supply-side adjustments aimed at boosting competitiveness most notably through 
wage moderation, a leaner welfare state, and lower employment protection (the “structural 
reforms”) constrained European governments to engage in a non-cooperative strategy through 
fiscal and social competition. 
 Fiscal and monetary policy alike contributed to sustaining aggregate demand. Tables 5 and 6 
report descriptive statistics for monetary and fiscal policy respectively in the past decade . 
From table 5 it emerges that short term rates have been on average very similar in the EMU 
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and in the US (only 20 basis points of difference). This is per se not informative, because the 
level of the interest rate has to be determined in regard to inflation and output gap objectives. 
In fact the most striking aspect of table 4 is the much higher variability of interest rates in the 
United States, with the standard error which is double with respect to the EMU, and a spread 
between the maximum and the minimum value which is also significantly larger. 
 
Table 5: Interest Rates Descriptive Statistics 1999-2010 
  Fed Funds Repo  
Mean 3.12 2.90  
s.e. 2.00 1.03  
Max 6.5 4.75  
Min 0.25 1  
Source: Datastream   
 
A very similar conclusion can be reached by looking at a similar table for fiscal policy. Table 
6 reports the descriptive statistics of the fiscal impulse4 for the largest European economies, 
the UK, US and Japan. It emerges clearly that the US had on average a more expansionary 
stance (in spite of higher growth rates, see Figure 4), and, as with monetary policy, it showed 
significantly higher variability over the period than Germany, France or Italy. The superior 
reactivity of American fiscal authorities is not surprising if we consider that on one hand 
European countries are subject to the constraints of the Stability and Growth Pact; and on the 
other that the US have a lower level of social protection and of automatic stabilization, which 
calls for a more active role of macroeconomic policies aimed at limiting harmful fluctuations 
of income. 
 
Table 6: Fiscal Impulse : Descriptive Statistics 1999-2010 
  GER ITA ESP FRA EU4* UK USA JAP 
Mean 0.12 -0.01 0.21 0.24 0.14 0.84 0.75 -0.35 
s.e. 0.81 0.88 1.89 0.58 0.58 1.63 1.35 2.24 
Max 1.68 1.44 5.25 1.15 2.89 4.63 2.89 2.72 
Min -0.79 -1.44 -1.16 -0.47 -0.76 -1.00 -0.81 -4.70 
Source: Datastream 
*EU4 is weighed with GDP  
                                                 
 
4 The fiscal impulse is computed as the negative of year on year changes in cyclically adjusted government net 
lending. It measures the discretionary fiscal stance of the country, a positive number denoting an expansionary 
period. 
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 Towards an “American Model”? 
The argument developed in the preceding sections may lead to pledge for abandoning the 
European model in favor of the one adopted in the US, which through financial development 
and active macroeconomic policies has been able to cushion contingent event, but above all 
the structural shock represented by increased income inequality. In fact the crisis that we are 
still living proves that sustaining the level of activity through private debt and active 
macroeconomic policies is not sustainable. The large amount of savings by the top earners has 
been channeled in speculative activities that have fueled bubbles in series (stock markets in 
the 1990s, housing in the first half of the 2000s, see Figure 9) that created the illusion of 
wealth and hence triggered ever increasing levels of debt. The large amount of liquidity made 
available by monetary authorities exacerbated this excess of financial means looking for a 
placement. 
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Figure 9 - US Asset Prices, 1990-2009 
Source: Datastream – OECD 
 
In fact, the increasing level of debt was apparently compensated by the increase of wealth that 
nevertheless was not linked to fundamentals, but to the excess demand for some assets that 
drove up the prices. 
The seemingly virtuous circle of increasing debt and asset prices that sustained economic 
activity in the US, would have proven to be unsustainable much earlier, were it not matched 
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by disequilibria of the opposite sign in Europe and in other areas of the world (East Asia and 
oil producing countries), that with their excess savings contributed to finance American 
growth, and to perpetuate this fragile equilibrium. 
 
To summarize, the pressure on aggregate demand induced by increasing inequality has 
pushed the world economy between the Scylla of high and unsustainable growth and the 
Charybdis of stagnant economies unable to sustain their level of growth with domestic 
demand, and constrained to rely on exports. None of the two paths has proven to be a 
solution. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
It will serve no purpose to design a strategy which will permit us to avoid Scylla at the cost of 
meeting Charybdis . The crisis was an interesting mixture of social and financial causes. The 
financiarisation of the economy may have helped to accelerate the trend towards growing 
inequalities. But certainly this trend served well the growth of the overinflated financial 
sector. The latter has hidden during a period the consequences of the social disequilibria, that 
is a potential deficiency of global demand, but at the price of pushing the economy from one 
bubble to another and of diverting resources from productive use. To cure a bad by a bad is 
not such a good idea. May be it would be preferable to try to eliminate the disequilibria 
themselves. Much is said in this report on the measures that the world and individual 
countries should take to keep financial markets under control. Intelligent regulation is a case 
in point. A revision of monetary policy strategies is another. Simple inflation targeting does 
not seem anymore the nec plus ultra of monetary policy. At a time when the boundary 
between monetary and fiscal policies becomes fuzzy, when the control of asset prices 
becomes a major objective for macroeconomic stability, we have to accept the sheer fact that 
monetary policy should also have several objectives and instruments and should strengthen its 
cooperation with fiscal policy.  
To avoid that the social disequilibria nurture again the financial one, the trend towards 
increasing inequalities should be reversed. For sure that is easier to say than to do, but it is 
absolutely crucial. They are several roads that the world economy could take for that purpose. 
The more obvious one is cooperation, the end of beggar my neighbor policies. Export led 
strategy when they are not based on objective factors (developing economies, ageing of 
population etc.) should not be tolerated by whatever international institution the G20 will give 
birth to. A second, and theoretically easier, is tax cooperation and/or tax harmonization to 
avoid fiscal and social competition. We have seen how the tax system has evolved towards 
less and less progressivity. Together with the decrease of business taxation, that is 
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impoverishing the State and makes it unable to confront its social obligations. This evolution 
is a sufficient explanation for the search of a leaner welfare state almost everywhere. It has a 
further consequence when the economies are confronted to a shock, the decrease of automatic 
stabilizers. More than 20 years ago, the levels of the marginal rate of taxation and of the profit 
taxes were powerful in amortizing macroeconomic shocks, especially the latter in reason of 
the volatility of profit with the business cycles (Solow, (2004)).  In a nutshell, increasing 
inequalities, meager welfare states, lower automatic stabilizers are recipes both to increase the 
vulnerability of the economic system and above all economic insecurity. The fact that the 
latter is not included in the PIB does not mean that it has not a strong effect on economic well 
being (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, (2009)). 
A third road is to inform societies about the state of inequalities characterizing their countries. 
Maybe a yearly parliamentary debate informed by the national statistical institutes and the 
work of the researchers may speed the consciousness of both civil society and politicians.  
Europe could serve as a laboratory for these kinds of measures as in principle it has the 
institutions and the need of implementing them may be more than other countries. 
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